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1THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: A PAPER 
UMBRELLA IN THE RAIN? INITIAL PITFALLS AND BRIGHTER 
PROSPECTS
By Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*
The tragedy which befell Rwanda in 1994 deserves a special place in the bloodstained pages of history. 
The Rwandan genocide merits distinction primarily because of its shocking efficiency, its scale and its 
proportional dimensions among the victim population.1 The Security Council's resolution establishing the 
ICTR articulates a set of decisions, assumptions, wishes, and objectives.2 Primarily, the States that voted 
in favour of the creation of the ICTR indicated that the root of the problem was individual violations of 
international criminal law. Only one State that voted for the resolution did not equate ipso facto ICTR 
actions with justice. That State considered the ICTR only one of the many tasks at hand for the 
international community. The ICTR was merely a vehicle of justice, ‘but it is hardly designed as a vehicle 
for reconciliation.... Reconciliation is a much more complicated process’ (Czech Republic).3 Interestingly, 
Rwanda, which voted against the resolution, spoke of the problem in terms of a culture of impunity.4 The 
UN paid little to no heed to the subtle, but extremely different way in which the problem was 
characterised and the implications this would have on the type of tool needed to deal with that problem. 5
Introduction
The genocide of 1994 was anything but a surprise for the international community. It 
was the culmination of many years of cynical indifference and wilful blindness to the 
plight of the Rwandan people. In the words of the then Rwandan representative to the 
Security Council: “Since 1959 Rwanda has repeatedly experienced collective 
massacres, which, as early as 1964, were described by Pope Paul VI and two Nobel 
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will ever be known.
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 The ICTR's sister tribunal in Yugoslavia, the ICTFY, was clearer about what it believed to be its 
objectives by interpreting its mandate from the Security Council. They are, to bring to justice those 
responsible; to contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed by acting as 
a powerful deterrent to all parties against continued participation in inhuman acts; to gradually promote 
an end to armed hostilities; to be a tool for promoting reconciliation by working to attribute acts to 
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revenge. See First Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, in ICTFY Year Book (1994) 81, 86-87, UN Sales No E.95.III.P.2. The 
UN Legal Counsel Carl August Fleischhauer stated that the tribunal was set up with three aims: ending 
war crimes, bringing perpetrators to justice, and breaking the cycle of ethnic violence and retribution. See 
Andrew Kelly, ‘Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Starts Work’. Chicago Sun-Times, 18 November 1993, 
52.
2Prize winners - Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre - as the most atrocious acts of 
genocide this century after that of the Jews during the Second World War. But 
whenever such tragedies occurred the world kept silent and acted as though it did not 
understand that there was a grave problem of the violation of human rights.”6 Thus in 
1994, the international community became a spectator to an archetypal genocide, the 
attempted extermination of an entire people. 
The slaughter required extensive administrative and logistical planning, evidenced by 
the chillingly calculated and thorough way in which it was carried out, and by the fact 
that most of the victims – between 500,000 and 1 million mainly Tutsi persons as well 
as politically moderate Hutu leaders and their families7 - were killed over the relatively 
short period from 6 April through the first three weeks of May 1994. This death toll 
amounts to roughly ten percent of the Rwandan national population.8 Notwithstanding 
the ‘low-tech’ nature of the massacres, (Victims were butchered with machetes  (panga), 
sticks, tools, and large clubs studded with nails (masu))9 “[t]he dead of Rwanda 
accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was 
the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
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3Nagasaki”.10 The genocide was the culmination of several prior mass killing orgies. It 
was a well-organised and coordinated event.11
Immediately preceding and during the Rwandan genocide, the political 
instrumentalisation of ethnicity was so focused and so pointed that Hutu were led to 
believe - and many actually believed - that they were doing good by killing Tutsi. The 
genocide was not about ethnic identity operating as a constitutive element of Rwandans’ 
personal identity. Rather, the genocide was about ethnicity operating coercively as the 
unwavering, singular expression of good or evil, of ‘us’ and ‘them’.12
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) grew out of the response of the 
UN human rights system to the Rwandan tragedy.  Parallel to the efforts within the UN 
human rights system, the government of Rwanda that came to power by toppling the 
genocidal regime13 made a request to the UN Security Council for assistance to bring 
those responsible for the genocide to justice.14 Based on its concern that the serious and 
extensive human rights violations in Rwanda would disrupt international peace and 
10
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4security,15 the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII authority under the UN Charter
and established the ICTR “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such 
violations committed in the territory of [neighbouring] States, between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994.”16 The preamble of the Resolution states the main objectives of 
the International Tribunal to be those of accountability, deterrence and a desire to 
contribute to national reconciliation and the maintenance of peace. It is against these 
objectives that the performance of the ICTR should be gauged.17 As indicated by the 
preambular paragraphs of Security Council Resolution 955 of 1994, the ICTR hopes to 
deter the culture of impunity by confronting it with accountability and thus defusing the 
cyclical waves of mass killings that plague Rwanda. 
15
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16 See SC Res 955, supra note 2. See also L. D. Johnson, ‘The International Tribunal for Rwanda’, 67 
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal (1996) p. 211; L. S Sunga, ‘The Commission of Experts on Rwanda 
and the Creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 16 Human Rights Law Journal
(1995) p. 121.
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 The Preamble of SC Res 955, supra note 2, provided in part:
The Security Council,
... Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide 
and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international 
humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda, ...
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to 
justice the persons responsible for them,
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of 
persons responsible for genocide and the above-mentioned violations of 
international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would 
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace,
Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of 
persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international 
humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and 
effectively redressed. . . . 
5The ICTR was intended to bring justice to the most serious perpetrators of the genocide 
and other violations of international humanitarian law and to ensure that such violations 
do not reoccur.18  However, while courts are needed to enforce law, courts, however, do 
not and cannot make human rights real. The achievement of human rights is a much 
more complex process than the establishment of a court.  While the Rwanda tribunal 
responded to the lawyer’s gradualist approach to institutional and normative 
development of international criminal law, it initially failed to successfully address the 
basic purposes for which it was established, to end impunity and deter potential 
offenders. It has been hampered by conceptual considerations. 
To delve more deeply into the ICTR’s handicap in addressing the human right’s 
situation in Rwanda through the international penal process, this Article makes use of a 
distinction of looking at human, social or for that matter world affairs: the actor-
orientated and structure-orientated perspectives.19 They can be seen as two ways of 
reflecting, and reflecting on, social affairs and legal tradition, each of them focusing on 
different aspects. The legal paradigm (especially criminal law) is biased in favour of the 
actor-oriented perspective due to its simplistic concreteness, identification of the evil 
actor, apprehension and prosecution. This Article sets out to consider the initial focus of 
the ICTR on classical criminal law theory and the failings of this in fulfilling the 
broader objectives of the international penal process which transcend the prosecution 
and conviction of guilty persons. The Article then moves on to consider the significance 
of restorative justice paradigms in reconstructing the post-genocidal society before 
concluding with positive trends and transformations that the international and domestic 
18 Ibid. paras. 1-2.
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 J. Galtung, Human Rights in Another key (Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1994) 26-49.
6processes adopted after a realisation of the limited scope of criminal trials in addressing 
the genocide.
The Rwandan Genocide: An Event or a State of Affairs
The first prosecutor of the ICTR held views that are generally similar to those of many 
within the prosecutorial profession. He believed the fear of detection, financial 
penalties, and indignities of guilt were at the centre of criminal justice. Like most 
prosecutors, he placed the judicial response at the top of the hierarchy noting, “… all 
criminal lawyers will agree, detection and punishment are the only means by which to 
curb criminal conduct.”20 Being that the ICTR prosecution office was largely focused 
with what to do with the evil actors, the answer was necessarily threefold; converting 
them to better intentions, weakening them by depriving them of capability and/or 
making them more passive in general. The rude reality though is that the trials and 
convictions of the then 53 indictees21 on the ICTR’s list of shame would not have some 
kind of legal domino effect on the acts and intents on the rest of the perpetrators 
numbering tens of thousands, many of whom were (and still are) active in guerrilla-style 
military incursions against the Tutsi-dominated government in power. 
Obviously the mass murders in Rwanda did not arise spontaneously. They were 
instigated by persons in positions of power who sought to gain personal advantages 
through violent and hideous means. Unless these persons are held accountable for their 
crimes against humanity, the reconciliation necessary for the reconstruction of this torn 
20
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View’ 7 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1997) p. 2.
21 See ‘Press Briefing by the Spokesman for the ICTR’, 19 October 2000, Doc. ICTR/INFO-9-13-018, 
http//www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/pressbrief191000.html, visited 20 March 2000.
7society may not be possible. By assigning guilt to the leader-instigators, the tribunal 
may also lift the burden of collective guilt that settles on the Hutus, whose leaders 
directed or ordered such terrible violence. The assignment of guilt by a neutral tribunal 
may also enable the international community to differentiate between victims and 
aggressors. However the international justice process could not erase the fact that the 
interethnic conflict while not genetically inbred, is firmly embedded in the socio-
cultural structure and subconscious of the Rwandan society and thus addressing this 
structural defects is part of the process of deterrence.
The initial sole focus on the ICTR indictees was unrealistic and demonstrated that the 
Tribunal was unclear about why it existed and how it could make its modest 
contribution for the betterment of human rights in the region.22 There is an abundance of 
the ‘evil’ ones, those who have already through their acts proved that they are evil, as 
well as those who may be suspected of harbouring evil intentions. The causes of the 
Rwandan tragedy rest with them, expressed in their acts or threats or general inclination 
to engage in evil acts but the fact is that the international penal process will only try a 
minuscule fraction of the whole group of perpetrators, the indictees.23 So many people 
were killed principally because there were so many killers. Significant numbers of 
Rwandans perpetrated the bloodbath. What induced so many individuals to participate 
was not coercion, but rather genuine support of the idea that the Tutsi had to be 
eliminated, together with the pursuit of solidarity with others in attaining this goal. This 
belief that one was doing right by killing explains why so many of the killings were so 
22
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8brutal.24 Many Hutus believed that killing the Tutsi was a civic duty - in other words, 
nothing less than the right thing to do.25  An even larger number of people acquiesced in 
the face of genocide. The killings were committed publicly and were known to all.26
They ‘did not take place at out-of-the-way sites…[but] throughout the country: in 
virtually every village and in almost every urban neighbourhood’.27 The indirect or 
direct participation of so many people in the Rwandan genocide blurs the line between 
guilt and innocence.  
In order to perform the genocide, the Hutu leaders over the years succeeded in 
organising a campaign that redefined the Tutsis (the victim group) as worthless, outside 
the web of mutual obligations, a threat to the Hutu hegemony, and in the run-up to the 
1994 genocidal conflagration, as subhuman. Even after such a campaign of vilification 
and dehumanisation28 the actual performance of the mass killing required a good deal of 
coercion and centralised control that converted a large segment of the Hutu populace 
23
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cruelty’. Such dehumanisation, he explained, is the ‘reverse of the psychology of love’ because no human 
being can love a non-human object ‘unless the object undergoes psychic humanization in the imagination 
of the lover’. When someone loves her dog ‘it is because the dog has been, in some sense, 
anthropomorphized,’ and when someone loves his ‘motherland’ it is because his imagination ‘has 
invoked a metaphor of human kinship’ with the territory. The psychology of hate, on the other hand, 
requires ‘a partial reduction of humanity’. Since it is difficult to hate an inanimate object or animal, the 
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World Culture, in Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (UNESCO, Paris, 1986) p. 243.
9into a band of mass killers and thus criminals. While much was initially said about the 
pragmatic dimension of punishing mass human rights violations through prosecutions as 
a preventive measure no paradigm was set out in relation to the task of post-conflict 
peace-building which entails a psychological dimension of justice and reconciliation. 
The ICTR’s initial almost exclusive focus on concrete entities; the individual as a 
building block of the genocidal reality was distorting and obscuring the structural reality 
that converted tens of thousands of Hutus into a mass of killers, turning on their friends, 
neighbours and colleagues.29 The 1994 genocide followed three earlier rounds of 
massacres targeting Tutsis in 1959, 1963 and 1966.30 The 1994 bloodbath was preceded 
by a macabre dress rehearsal in 1992.31 With preparations complete, in 1994 the 
government was able to manipulate the structure founded on sharp, ethno-centric rift by 
fuelling the hatred through national radio (Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines) 
broadcasts that dehumanised the Tutsis as ‘inyenzi’ (cockroaches),32 facilitating the 
creation of an effective killing machine that stretched from the city suburbs to remote 
farms in the village. 
29
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31
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This process of dehumanisation was a contrivance of populist leaders which feed on the 
primitive impulse to denigrate the Tutsis as a means of self-affirmation. Before ordinary 
Hutu could participate in the slaughter of defenceless men, women and children, the 
Tutsi had to be portrayed as an inherently bloodthirsty and cruel people out to break the 
Hutu hegemony through violence and thus, it was necessary to launch preventive 
measures, which incidentally took the form of preventive violence. The Hutus were 
spurred on by exhortations appealing to them as a collectivity to preserve their ethnic 
hegemony by eliminating all sympathisers and supporters of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) whose military successes had forced the government onto the negotiation 
table.33
For many though, the ICTR would establish individual guilt and thereby move 
suspicion and blame from the group to the individual. It was a laudable goal, but a 
complex one in the circumstance. For crimes to be crimes there must be an individual 
act. These crimes may or may not be part of a criminal enterprise. When a crime is part 
of a criminal enterprise, the nature of the relation between the individual, crime, and 
society profoundly changes.34 Any penal response to a criminal enterprise must 
33
 Motivated to regain their former position of prestige in the country, and concerned to aid their brothers 
and sisters in Rwanda from the recurrent violence perpetrated against them, Tutsi paramilitary forces 
coalesced into the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF launched small-scale incursions from 
neighbouring countries into Rwandan territory in order to force the Hutu dominated government towards 
power- sharing. By 1993, it was clear to the Hutu Government that the Rwandan Patriotic Front had 
become an insurgency movement capable of destabilising Rwanda and that it would be prudent to explore 
the possibilities of a cease-fire. Negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front commenced at Arusha, Tanzania, on 10 August 1992.
34
 When people engage in crime as a series or pattern of illegal acts which result in an uneven or 
incomplete meting out of punishment, some implicit or explicit accommodation must be made within any 
criminal justice system. This process of compromising law enforcement involves a wide range of 
considerations with direct impact on the organisational pattern and structure, which can be traced to the 
nature of law itself. See C. H. McCaghy and S. A. Crime in American Society (Macmillan, New York, 
1987).
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understand the entire crime and its relation to society to begin to address it effectively 
through the justice system.35
Within the ICTR’s early framework of thinking, the genocidal acts by extremist Hutus 
were seen as an event, not a state of affairs; something that was is and probably will 
continue to lurk in the sub-consciousness of the extremists. It may be a slowly or 
quickly changing state of affairs, depending on the circumstances, key among which is 
the process of the extremists reclaiming back political and military authority in Rwanda. 
The war in Rwanda is unfinished; there was not even a temporary respite after the 
genocide, before the Hutu-Tutsi struggle for the control of the State resumed. There is 
little doubt in this context that the ICTR was largely seen by Hutus, as international 
punishment by the victors, Tutsis with the blessing and support of the United Nations.36
Tutsis may themselves see the Tribunal and the genocide trials they are conducting in 
35
 Criminal enterprise behaviour is a type of behaviour that invariably arises as a natural social 
phenomenon in nearly every society. It is a social  epidemic that takes different forms at different times 
across these societies, but because its etiology so differs from that of individual criminal behaviour, its 
effect on society and its demand of a response from the justice system is markedly different as well. 
Crime as part of a criminal enterprise almost always results in selective and discriminatory enforcement 
of laws. The use of discretion in dealing with these offences by a criminal justice system offers an 
opportunity for criminal forces to strongly influence the justice process itself. In a sense, a functional 
‘tolerance policy’ by law enforcement bureaucracies may develop and often does. When responding to 
crime as part of a criminal enterprise, social control bureaucracies are confronted with the vexing problem 
of enforcing laws about which little, sporadic, or inconsistent social consensus among society's many 
groups may be discerned. See J. R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American 
Temperance Movement (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1963). The community's ruling elite 
inevitably finds itself in an odd position, a position which potentially can severely challenge its authority 
as a justice insurer. The ruling elite must select which values within the community it must advance and 
then either selectively enforce laws and punishments, or attempt to obliterate a portion or all of the class 
of violators. Irrespective of this problem, if a justice system is to respond in an effective way to organised, 
crimes it must seek, quite naturally, to develop its coalition of support in order to expand not only its 
budgetary/personnel resources and their enforcement power, but its will to pass and enforce laws 
proscribing the offensive behaviours. See H. S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance
(Free Press, New York, 1963).
36
 Credibility of the Rwanda Tribunal is unlikely to materialise among Hutus because they are its main 
targets. The prosecution of Tutsis is essential for the tribunal's legitimacy. In the case of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal, the prosecution of Bosnians and Croats - and not just Serbs - would enhance that tribunal's 
legitimacy in the eyes of perpetrators across the board.
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Rwanda as their opportunity for revenge.37 The ICTR being initially obsessed by a need 
to be neutral and independent distanced itself from the overall political settlement of the 
Hutu-Tutsi struggle for political power and thus was virtually irrelevant to the future of 
Rwanda.38
What the ICTR (and the international community) hoped to achieve in the euphoric 
early days of the ICTR soon fell victim to the reality of the structural underpinning of 
the genocide. The ICTR hoped to bring about a discontinuous jump, by breaking the 
vicious cycle of human rights violations through an international presence that was little 
felt in Rwanda itself. It was not apparent then that the deep-seated animosity between 
the two segments of the Rwandan population would not dispel easily by a few years of 
international justice. The animosity and hatred was cultivated, reinforced and 
manipulated for over six decades by the colonial powers, then well nurtured by the Hutu 
leaders who ascended to power after independence. It has taken close to a century to 
achieve a well-entrenched social structure pegged on ethnic stratification, founded on 
deep-seated hatred.39 This is not to say that the effort at prosecution is an exercise in 
futility. Obviously there are actors around otherwise the structure would not operate.  
Individual guilt, leading to prosecution is important, but it should not detract from the 
flaws in the Rwandan social structure. The actor-oriented perspective draws its strength 
from its simplistic concreteness; its ability at capturing concrete actors; the individuals. 
But only a segment of an actor is in the structure, and only a part of the structure shows 
37
 P. Akhavan, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of 
Punishment’ 90 American Journal of International Law (1996) p. 508. It is interesting to note that the 
RPF government wanted the Rwanda Tribunal situated in Rwanda so that it would teach the ‘Rwandan 
people a lesson, to fight against the impunity to which it had become accustomed ... and to promote 
national reconciliation’. But this is only possible if the tribunal enjoys some credibility with the 
perpetrators.
38
 A. D. Lowell, ‘Nuremberg in Rwanda: Not Enough’ Legal Times, 3 April 1995, pp. 23-25.
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up in any one particular actor. While the ICTR’s indictees may have been architects of 
the genocide, they simply tapped into the huge reservoir of ethno-centric hate that had 
been entrenched in the sub-consciousness of Hutu’s converting a great deal of them into 
pathological killers.
Having a positive impact on a complex socio-political process is not the same as 
successfully prosecuting a person for a criminal violation of human rights law in accord 
with the law. Only by seeking to address the causal factors of the genocide would the 
ICTR translate its prosecutorial victories into victory for human rights in Rwanda. The 
ICTR initially failed to provide an institutional framework that would contribute to the 
extremely complex process of moving a society from one characterised by massive 
human rights violations to one built upon the respect of human rights law. A key 
oversight in the ICTR’s prosecutorial strategy was its failure to seek to address the 
accumulation of collectively organised evil within the Rwandan society, entrenched 
over a period of almost one century.40
A Leaky Sieve? The Pitfalls of Classical Criminal Law Theory 
Virtually all theories of criminal justice can be characterized as either retributive or 
deterrent (utilitarian).41 For utilitarians punishment is justified to the extent it produces a 
socially desirable consequence, ordinarily general deterrence.42 In contrast, 
39 See Part II of the Article.
40 See generally A. Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, trans. A. Marschner (New 
York University Press, New York, 1995); Prunier, supra note, p. 13.
41
 See J. Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ in Robert M Baird & Stuart E Rosenbaum (eds), Philosophy of 
Punishment (Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1988), 38; W. de Haan, The Politics of Redress: Crime, 
Punishment and Penal Abolition (Unwin Hyman, London, 1990) p. 103, noting that all theories of 
punishment are based on retribution and deterrence.
42
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consequences are irrelevant for retributionists. Rather they consider it simply morally 
fitting that criminal offenders are punished.43 Described by R. Solomon, “the desire for 
retribution is the desire for vengeance (,)…getting even, putting the world back in 
balance”.44 The international penal process at the ICTR was initially firmly focused on 
deterrent and retributive aspects of the criminal process with little pragmatic effort to 
incorporate rehabilitative and restorative aspects into its overall strategy.
The Deterrence Theory
Whether the offence is tax evasion or genocide, deterrence theory presupposes a 
rational, utility-maximizing actor. Persons commit crimes, so the theory goes, when the 
expected value of doing so exceeds the cost of punishment. To reduce crime, society 
need only raise the price by imposing harsh penalties. The complexity of the Rwandan 
situation and the operations of the ICTR would frustrate those who advocate 
punishment as deterrence. Societies engulfed by mass political violence are not 
particularly conducive to rational behaviour or fears of eventual apprehension. How can 
we expect individuals to make a rational choice calculus when they are surrounded by 
hysteria, social chaos, panic, coercion, prejudice, and a government that is exhorting 
mass violence?45 Layered on top of the irrational context in which mass violence 
43
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operates is the reality that an individual’s decision to act violently may not be perceived 
as a legal or even a moral wrong. When taken together, these two factors support the 
conclusion that choices to participate in mass violence well may be only slightly, if at 
all, deterred by the prospect of eventual prosecution - especially if undertaken by some 
distant international tribunal. If those committing the barbarities do not expect to lose 
power to the victims (or to third parties such as international authorities), they may not 
take the threat of penal sanction very seriously.46
Punishments even if they are imposed to any real extent by the ICTR, will be meted out 
slowly, given limited resources.47 The fact that cases are handled in a slow and 
circuitous manner contravenes the axiom that for deterrence to work punishments must 
be meted out with swiftness and certainty.48 It is unrealistic to presuppose that a nascent 
institution operating in the Rwandan genocidal context could act efficiently enough for 
the desired deterrent impact to be realised. Approximately 125,000 individuals - roughly 
ten percent of the adult male Hutu population - are incarcerated in Rwandan jails 
designed to hold 15,000.49 At the present rate of national trials, it would take hundreds 
Tribunal must be directed,...at deterrence, namely to dissuade for ever [sic], others who may be tempted 
in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing them that the international community shall not 
tolerate the serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.”); Prosecutor v 
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of years to adjudge all of these detainees.50 The ICTR was not of much help either in 
reducing the number of detainees, by late 2000, after spending over 200 million dollars; 
it had indicted 53 individuals and heard only nine cases.51
Seemingly, the ICTR’s presence was not having the intended sobering effect on the 
Hutu extremists. This would be largely because the general stance of the international 
community was to view the genocide in terms of a sudden event, the evil act of the evil 
actor, and thus the international penal process is seen as a remedy. But the evil act rests 
within a large part of the population, something permanent, the permanent evil intent 
among extremists in both groups wrought by a volatile social structure pegged on deep-
seated animosity that has spawned a strong culture of hatred and ethnic rift. 
While the creation of the ICTR may have a lasting effect on the application of 
humanitarian law to both international and domestic conflicts and accomplish what its 
first Prosecutor Goldstone stated, as the significant task of and human rights squarely on 
the international agenda,52 the Tribunal ran the risk of not making a significant 
contribution if it failed to generate substantial appreciation on the part of Hutus of the 
extreme criminality of acts of the mass killings, or with regard to the Tutsis, the fact that 
reciprocal counter-measures whether low intensity or not, amount to crimes based on 
the same legal standards that the Hutus face.
50
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It is not enough that the international penal process classifies the behaviour as wrong, 
extremely distasteful and the acts as international crimes. Until the Hutus (and 
extremists among the Tutsis who may have a vision of grand vengeance) are capable of 
doing so, they will not abstain from the act, risk of bad conscience or the risk of the 
State or international community applying normal standards built into national law and 
international treaties. Thus the extremists see their post-genocidal intention and actions 
in another direction, killing yes, but not with the intent of wiping out the other group, 
but with the intention of avenging their own personal losses, and furthering themselves 
and their ethnic hegemony through erosion and attrition of the other group in numbers. 
As Professor M. Drumbl notes:
“Many [domestic] detainees see themselves as prisoners of war, simply ending up 
on the losing side. In fact, the prisoners do not even call the events of April to July 
1994 the ‘genocide,’ but, instead, refer to these events as ‘the war.”53
The Retributive Theory
Retributionists believe that if offenders are not punished for their crimes, then other 
people will not respect the criminal law and not obey it. For this school of thought, the 
focus is on the development of strategies for administering the courts, the police and the 
prisons more effectively.54 Retribution attracts people that want a quick fix crime 
solution. Its usefulness as a tool for building a strong culture of justice in post-genocide 
Rwanda society was therefore limited. Retribution merely shifts the revenge over from 
52
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the individual to the State (and Tribunal).55 The ICTR was imbued with like sentiment 
and the characteristic self-righteous tenor of those striving to secure the ‘deserved’ 
punishment of others. This is not surprising, a look at Security Council proceedings 
regarding the aims of the ICTR unearths a majoritarian view by participating States 
favouring the ‘just desserts’ discourse.56 There is perhaps no greater canard than the 
idea that punitive justice provides needed therapy for individuals; that nothing can 
assuage anger or restore dignity like punishment. The emphasis on victimhood, blame, 
and powerlessness may actually undermine recovery from violent crime.
The willingness to punish the unusual is a basic criminal law philosophy. But if an actor 
commits an act that can be seen as ‘normal’ in the precise sense that the other actors in 
the same position would commit the same acts in the same situation, the justice process 
is then seen as motivated by vengeance. Mass violence constitutes what C. S. Santiago 
Nino, citing Kant, calls ‘radical evil’.57 ‘Radical evil’ amounts to violence in situations 
where acting violently is simply not deviant. Nino observes that “the kind of collective 
behaviour that leads to radical evil would not have materialized unless carried out with a 
high degree of conviction on the part of those who participated in it”.58 When this 
conviction is broadly shared, it loses its deviance no matter how pronounced its 
ugliness. Thus the extremists may see the international penal process as the 
consequence of their loss of political and military authority in Rwanda and not so much, 
as a process aimed specifically at their push to homogenise Rwanda and the resulting 
55
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atrocities. On the hand, the Tutsis are more focused on the national trials that will send 
the guilty to the gallows, not some ritzy international trial that will send the guilty to 
Europe.
Although the ICTR has a multi-million dollar budget, by late 2000, The ICTR had 53 
indictees, 45 of who were in custody59 and the Rwandan prisons have some 125,000 
individuals in custody over the genocide. The ICTR had completed only 4 trials, while 
the work on the 48 other cases was still underway. The fact though is that between 
75,000 to 150,000 possible defendants spread throughout Rwanda and in neighbouring 
countries as refugees will never see the inside of a courtroom.60 What about them? Do 
they get the message that their actions were wrong and atrocious? For some yes, for 
most unlikely. Journalist P. Gourevitch asks and then eerily concludes: “[W]hat 
if…murder and rape become the rule?”61 “During the genocide, the work of the killers 
was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land….”62 The 
ICTR relied on the actor-oriented approach in which it is easy to see who should be 
apprehended, arraigned into court, adjudicated and eventually punished.63 This objective 
tended not to build dynamism and dialectics into the ICTR’s vision on not only 
prosecuting the guilty, but also addressing impunity. The ICTR sought to depict and 
regulate an event where certain acts are proscribed. The rest was left open.
59
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Restorative Justice: Beyond a Simplistic Bipolar Leitmotiv
Analysing the negative implications of criminal trials in the reconstruction of post-
genocide Rwandan society, Professor M. Drumbl astutely notes that:
“Trials create a bipolar leitmotiv of the postgenocidal society, which is binarily 
deconstructed into the ‘guilty’ and the ‘innocent’. This deconstruction runs the risk 
of oversimplifying history by negating the importance of collective wrongdoing, 
acquiescent complicity, and the embeddedness of ‘radical evil’. By treating 
genocidal violence as an individualised, pathological, and deviant transgression of 
social propriety, the criminal justice system may do the dualist postgenocidal society 
a disservice by blanketing and perpetuating the structural nature of this violence to 
the detriment of survivors and future generations. Blaming occurrences of radical 
evil entirely on the existence of some evil people obscures the fact that so many 
people, to varying degrees of complicity, are required for ‘radical evil’ to operate 
publicly on a macro level.”64
The more holistic perspective of restorative justice may actually help a society manage 
multiple goals because it identifies restoration - not deterrence, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, or retribution - as the overarching goal of criminal justice. A restorative 
approach seems needed in all societies that have suffered massive and collective 
victimisation.65 There had to be an effort to identify that there are other units, 
individuals or groups that should be the target of efforts to restore order to the badly 
fractured Rwandan society. Backing a remedy designed to socialise individuals, the 
ICTR simply envisioned a society disintegrated into an amoral Hobbesian war of all 
against all, rather than into rival moral communities. Deftly noted by Dennis Wrong, for 
group-level conflict to occur, the individual group members must already ”have been 
socialised to…correctly gauge the expectations of others, internalise at least some 
norms, and possess selves sensitive to the appraisal of others”.66 The familiar lack of 
64
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remorse shown for acts that if committed against a member of one’s own group would 
draw heavy censure, signals a disjunction between groups’ values and norms.
The ICTR’s seeming view that applying individual level justice would promote social 
order was bound to fail if it was the only tool envisaged. Individual level punishments 
can only affect a permanent change if the cause of the deviant behaviour resides solely 
with the individual.67 In Rwanda, however, it is impossible to conclude that the causes 
of deviance reside with the individual. As the ICTR was focusing its attention on 
individual deviants, it was presenting the world, and the Rwandans, with the image of a 
person who needs correcting through punishment instead of a social system, structurally 
stratified by ethnic rift that needs reorganisation. The Tribunal while an important 
instrument by which those responsible for the genocide are distinguished from moderate 
Hutus, needed to be nonetheless be alive to the destabilising effect being posed by Hutu 
extremists, many of who are not in custody, and are unlikely to ever face prosecution. 
While the prosecution of former leaders is an essential ingredient for reconciliation at 
the political level, there has to be a corresponding transformation of values among the 
Rwandan people who have been subjected to decades of incitement to ethnic hatred and 
violence, whether as victim or as obedient perpetrator. The Tutsi must absolve the Hutu 
of indefinite collective responsibility for the genocide while also having a legitimate 
means of vindicating their suffering through a ‘collective catharsis’. The ICTR in 
concert with the Rwanda national trials can play a decisive role in this respect.  
Structures cannot be juridical persons with intentions and capabilities. They cannot 
156; M. Thompson-Noel, ‘Home Truths About Genocide-Murderous Disputes in Faraway Places Bring 
Out the Honest Pessimist’ Financial Times (London), 13 January 1996, xvi.
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distinguish between right and wrong. While structures cannot be put on trial, they can 
be changed through rehabilitation, by focusing on them as the primary root of the 
problem as well as the  indictees of the tribunal. 
Attention needed be paid to how reconciliation could be facilitated in post-genocide 
Rwanda. Adopting a restorative approach seemed part of the answer. The restorative 
school of criminal justice demonstrates the importance of behavioural, material, 
emotional, and cognitive outcomes for victims, offenders, and societal members.68
Success in sanctioning is measured by the degree of reparation for the victims and their 
participation, or better yet their ownership, in the process. It also includes the 
recognition of the offenders of wrongdoing and their level of empathy with victims. It is 
further measured by the development of a shared perspective in society that offenders 
have been denounced and held accountable in a fair process. The Rwandan courts 
largely lacked credibility (and still do) with the group of perpetrators being prosecuted 
by an overwhelmingly Tutsi government, being overwhelmingly Hutu. Ethnic 
stratification is replayed as basically, the Tutsis are prosecuting the Hutus, the victors 
are entombing their victory through judicial process. The Rwandan national trials stood 
to gain by closer, formal cooperation between the national and international process, to 
alleviate the credibility problem.
While the Rwandan courts received mixed, and to a degree improving, reviews, many of 
the first trials were considered a disaster from a due process perspective. Most of the 
more than 125,000 detainees were arbitrarily arrested and have been detained for long 
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periods without trial.69 To many in Rwanda, this process negatively colours their 
impression of the Rwandan government and its ability to fairly treat those accused of 
genocide. The Rwandan trials will not help achieve reconciliation if they are considered 
unfair or if they are removed from the population.70 Rwanda itself warned when 
advocating for the creation of a tribunal with international participation of ‘victor’s 
justice’ if it organised the trials on its own.71
It would seem the case in Rwanda, that lasting reconciliation requires assigning 
individual responsibility for the atrocities, while it is imperative that trials of those
accused take place, clearly, the most resonant of such trials will be those in Rwanda, 
organised and accomplished by the Rwandan people, so that individual responsibility is 
an internal, rather than an external designation.72 It follows that the high profile of the 
ICTR, was overshadowing and stealing the ‘thunder’ from the national trials rather than 
complementing them. The ICTR had just about all the ‘big fish’ while the rest were left 
to the Rwandan national courts. 
The major reason why the international and national justice systems were failing to 
respond adequately to the Rwandan situation is that they inadequately focused on the 
crimes by defining them only as law breaking. The concentration is then solely on the 
69
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resulting adversarial relationship between government (or Tribunal) and the criminal 
offender. This existing pattern of thinking fails to address, or even recognise, the other 
dimensions involved. A human rights crime is not merely an offence against the State. 
Likewise, justice is more than punishment and incapacitation. There are larger issues at 
play, notably the issue of standards and norms. Despite the public nature of the 
genocidal violence, there is very little generally accepted truth in Rwanda as to what 
exactly happened from April to July 1994.73  In this regard, a truth commission could 
help establish an historical narrative of what happened as well as why it happened; 74
after this record is established, Rwandan society then could be better positioned to 
render a moral evaluation of the genocide.75
In a deeply divided society, arguably the only type of society likely to produce the types 
of crimes for which the ICTR was established, criminal prosecutions do not necessarily 
have a conciliatory effect. Rather, they manifest and exacerbate division if seen as some 
sort of panacea. This follows in part because those who would occupy the dock are 
73
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inevitably and widely seen as symbolic representatives of their group.76 The association 
is even greater in cases involving ‘big fish’. As the prosecution declared at the opening 
of the Adolf Eichmann trial, “It is not an individual that is in the dock (,)…but anti-
Semitism throughout history”.77 Given its metaphorical significance, one can hardly 
expect the ICTR to ameliorate collective guilt. On the contrary, it may actually revive 
and inflame antagonistic sentiment.78
The overall purpose of restorative justice is the reintegration of victims and offenders 
who have resolved their conflicts into safe communities.79 This purpose can only be 
achieved when multiple parties (victims, offenders, communities, governments) pursue 
multiple goals (redress, fairness, healing, and rehabilitation). There have been killings 
of a number of unarmed civilians, some by members of the Rwandan security forces, 
others by armed opposition groups (the interahamwe militia), others by unidentified 
assailants. Members of local defence forces have been responsible for killings and other 
abuses, especially in the northwest of Rwanda, sometimes in conjunction with Rwanda 
Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers.80 This reinforced the need to pursue multiple goals 
within the framework of objectives of the international justice system otherwise, the 
international community would have to find an alternative way to address human rights 
76
 See C. Simic, ‘Unfashionable Victims’ London Review of Books, 31 July 1997, p. 12 (stating that R. 
Karadzic and R. Mladic “are taken as embodiments of the soul of their people”).
77
 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, New York, 1963) 
p. 16.
78
 See T. Rosenberg, ‘Defending the Indefensible’, New York Times Magazine, 19 April 1998, pp. 46, 56 
(remarking on the “near-universal belief among Serbs that the tribunal is an anti-Serb instrument”).
79
 See D. Van Ness and K. H. Strong, Restoring Justice (Anderson, Cincinnati, 1997).
80 Amnesty International Report, infra note, 89. For a positive development, see T. Wanyonyi, ‘Peace 
May Be Crucial But So Is Justice to All’, Daily Nation (Kenya), 4 January 2001, Commentary, noting the 
UN Prosecutor’s announcement that the members of the RPA (formerly the rebel RPF) will be 
investigated for alleged killings during the genocide period when the RPF launches a major military 
offensive that brought the Tutsis to power.
26
abuses by an overzealous Tutsi-dominated army, clearly having personal and official 
business weaved into a single tapestry. 
A presupposition of the ICTR was that formal mechanisms are integral to uphold group 
life and to stem deviant behaviour.81 Reminiscent of pre-sociological thought, this view 
overlooked the “complex network of social ties which spontaneously creates a 
normative order that exists independently of (legal institutions)”.82 Cooperation and 
understanding by the Rwandan society is a sine qua non of long term ethnocentric hate 
control and societal restructuring. Although the Tutsis are now in control they cannot 
hold it without the goodwill of the Hutu segment.83 For lasting peace, N. Mandela 
proclaimed, “we do not rely on laws, we rely purely on persuasion”.84 Where society 
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depends instead on law, Gandhi concluded that “law ceases to be law, and society 
ceases to be society”.85
The inter-ethnic hatred in Rwanda is a ‘deep-culture’, a socio-cultural code embedded 
in the collective subconscious of the group entities, defining for that collective that it is 
normal/natural to adopt a ‘no-holds-barred’ approach to gaining ethnical supremacy and 
preserving the resulting ethnic hegemony. Being subconscious, there is not much 
individual awareness of deeply rooted international legal standards steering the rest of 
the world, the result of almost a century of brainwashing. With a deep structure of 
hatred and animosity rooted in a culture, the ICTR was running against something very 
solid indeed. A signal challenge to the ICTR is the core precept of Satyagraha, that the 
ends pre-exist in the means. In Gandhi’s words, “the belief that there is no connection 
between the means and the end is a great mistake…. The means may be likened to a 
seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the 
means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree.”86
Waking up to Reality: Trends and Transformations
Developments on the ICTR Front
Killings in Rwanda rose in the period after the ICTR’s founding.87 Although currently 
the number of killings inside Rwanda has decreased compared to the rather bloody 
1998-2000 period, killings of unarmed civilians and ‘disappearances’ were still reported 
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throughout 2001-2002. As government troops regained control of the northwest, the 
armed conflict abated and the level of violence decreased. However, the situation 
remained tense and the peace fragile. In many respects, the armed conflict during which 
thousands of civilians had been killed in Rwanda in 1998 continued over the border in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The presence of armed groups continued to 
be reported sporadically in Rwanda near the DRC border and the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army (RPA) (formerly the rebel RPF) carried out military operations in this area.88
The ICTR’s existence and presence in Eastern Africa was seemingly doing little to deter 
extremist Hutus in neighbouring countries from waging bloody guerrilla-style 
excursions into Rwanda. Thousands of unarmed civilians were killed across the border, 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in an armed conflict involving several 
governments, including Rwanda, as well as various armed opposition groups, including 
Rwandan interahamwe militia and soldiers of the former Rwandan armed forces. The
Rwandan government offered support to the rebel Congolese Rally for democracy 
(RCD) part of the deal being permission to conduct military operations in Congolese 
territory against Hutu extremists. The overzealous Rwandan government troops were 
not averse to conducting ruthless military operations around refugee camps89 reinforcing 
its apparent commitment to consolidating a national ethnocracy. The same zeal was 
reflected by the Hutu extremists keen to wrestle back the reins of power from the Tutsi 
dominated government.
88 Amnesty International Report, infra note 89.
89
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The ICTR was criticized (and rightly so) for not achieving its mandate swiftly enough. 
Although the ICTR has a multi-million dollar budget, by early 2000, six years after its 
establishment it had completed only four trials, while the work on the 48 other cases 
was still underway. One of the reasons for the delays, however, is that the ICTR is a 
nascent criminal court. At the start of 2000 however the ICTR shook of the lethargy that 
characterized its earlier years of existence. The ICTR made significant progress on 
numerous fronts in 2000. In addition to securing new convictions and concluding 
several appeals, the Tribunal significantly improved its relationship with the Rwandan 
government. The Tribunal began the year under a cloud of severely strained relations 
with the Rwandan government in the aftermath of the Appeals Chamber’s 1999 decision 
to dismiss charges against J. Barayagwiza.90 However, in March 2000, the Appeals 
Chamber quashed the earlier ruling and reinstated charges against Barayagwiza, which 
the Rwandan government saluted as a “victory for victims.”91
Keenly aware that an international justice process that fails to deter individuals with 
reason enough to value their lives and freedom can only be regarded as meaningless, the 
ICTR took numerous steps to repair and improve its relationships with the Rwandan 
government and citizens. In 2000, ICTR judges for the first time agreed to requests by 
the Rwandan government to personally visit crime scenes.92 More significantly, the 
ICTR’s chief prosecutor, C. Ponte, announced that she would ask the Trial Chambers to 
hold future hearings in Rwanda, and that in the future “it might even be possible to ... 
90
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[move] the entire Tribunal to Kigali.”93 Furthermore, in September 2000 the ICTR 
opened an information and outreach centre in Kigali, which will house a public 
information area, documents repository and legal library, and manage the Victims 
Assistance Programme.94
Fifteen months later, relations between the ICTR and the Rwandan government took a 
turn for the worse. The first sign of trouble occurred in January 2002 when two key 
Rwandan genocide survivors’ groups not only suspended their cooperation with the 
ICTR but also called on the Rwandan Government to do the same.95 Three months later 
in March 2002, a proposal for a joint ICTR/government task force fell on its face due to 
the “inability to agree on certain fundamental points, beyond compromise, regarding the 
proposed commission’s terms of reference.”96
It would appear that this was a politically motivated action based on the Prosecutor’s 
investigation of crimes allegedly committed by the Rwanda Patriotic Army soldiers 
representative to the ICTR, stated that the decision by the ICTR indicated that “many things have been 
put right as far as the workings of the Tribunal and its relationship with Rwanda ...” Ibid.
93
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affiliated with the current government.97 The Prosecutor later brought the dispute before 
the UN Security Council, noting that the attitude of the Government toward the tribunal 
had “hardened” because the ICTR began investigations of individuals with connections 
to the current Rwandan army.98 The Rwandan government soon backed away from its 
contentious policies but not after a sweetener was thrown its way, a freeze on 
investigations of RPF, yet another blow to the overall bid for reconciliation. Later in 
2002, the frosty relations thawed when Chief Prosecutor, C. Ponte, announced her 
intention to transfer forty suspects to Rwanda and other national jurisdictions for 
prosecutions bringing to fruition a promise made almost two years earlier.99 In addition, 
the Security Council granted the ICTR’s request to create a pool of eighteen ad litem 
judges to supplement the work of the nine trial judges already sitting on the ICTR with 
an aim of increased speed and efficiency after enacting similar reforms for the ICTY.100
The improved relations between the ICTR and the Rwandan government may facilitate 
what many believe is necessary to the ICTR’s legitimacy - investigation and, if 
appropriate, indictment and prosecution of persons from the largely Tutsi Rwandan 
97 Letter from K. Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to UN Security Council Members, 25 
October 2002, at http:// hrw.org/press/2002/10/noncooperation-Itr.htm, visited 5 March 2003.
98 S. Kaliisa, ‘ICTR Responds to Inefficiency Claims by Rwandan Government’, Internews, 16 August 
2002, http:// www.internews.org/activities/ICTR _reports/ICTRnewsJul02.html, visited 5 December 
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Negroponte, President of UN Security Council 9 August 2002, http://hrw.org/press/2002/rwanda-
Itr0809.htm, visited 14 January 2003.
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Patriotic Front (RPF).101 The RPF is the rebel movement that seized power after the 
massacres in Rwanda, and remains in power as Rwanda’s current government. The 
failure of the ICTR to indict RPF members exposed the Tribunal to criticisms of being a 
“victor’s tribunal.”102 The ICTR chief prosecutor not only intends to investigate RPF 
members, but initially publicly secured the cooperation of the Rwandan government in 
this endeavour.103
On the trial front, between 1 July 2001 and 30 June 2002, 11 accused persons were 
arrested, and the Prosecutions Division submitted 14 new indictments for confirmation, 
all of which were confirmed. Of the 60 persons already arrested, 8 were sentenced, 1 
was acquitted, 22 are involved in ongoing trials and 29 are in custody awaiting the 
commencement of their trials”.104 In the same period, the Tribunal was actively engaged 
in trials. Nine trials of 22 accused persons were in progress before three Trial Chambers, 
with three judgments in respect of four accused being rendered the following year.105 By 
the close of 2002, 81 individuals had been indicted by the ICTR, with 61 in custody and 
twenty at large.106 Eight people had been convicted by the ICTR, and the Appeals 
101 See ‘Missing’, The Economist, 23 December 2000 (US Edition).
102 See C. M. Carroll, ‘An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal 
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facilitate its investigation of international humanitarian law violations in Rwanda.” However, it has also 
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103
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Chamber upheld seven of those convictions.107 The 2001 acquittal of one individual was 
also upheld on appeal, and one appeal is currently pending.108 Trials are ongoing for 
twenty-two individuals.109 By the end of January 2004, the ICTR had rendered 15 
judgments involving 21 accused. This brings the total number of judgments during the 
ICTR’s second mandate to nine involving 14 accused. This represents a two-fold 
increase in trials compared to its first mandate (1995-1999). The Prosecutor also revised 
the ICTR’s future investigation programme from the originally estimated number of 136 
new suspects to 14 new individuals, together with 10 ongoing investigations. The 
resulting 24 new indictments, which the Prosecutor intends to submit for confirmation 
by the end of 2004, will conclude the investigation programme.110
More importantly, the Prosecutor identified 40 suspects whose prosecution was to be 
deferred to national jurisdictions for trial. Fifteen of these suspects were in countries 
that have adopted the principle of universal jurisdiction and could be tried in these 
countries. The cases of 25 other suspects who did not occupy high positions of 
responsibility could be transferred to the Rwandan authorities. This move is important 
as there is now a working strategy between the international and national penal 
processes. Instead of the initial position of the ICTR dealing solely with individual 
criminals and not with a culture of impunity, there is now recognition that synergy
between the international and domestic penal processes will give the latter legitimacy 
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Rwandan social process is being bridged and increasingly making the work of the 
ICTR’s relevant  to the Rwandan populace.
Developments on the National Front
After the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government did not have the judicial capacity or 
the legislation to deal with crimes of genocide. In 1996, therefore, the government 
adopted the Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting 
the Crimes of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed since 1 October 1990 
(‘Genocide Law’) and created a special judicial chamber to try the genocide cases an 
effort to hold individuals who will not be prosecuted by the ICTR responsible for 
international humanitarian law violations. The law created 13 specialised chambers 
within the court structure to deal with cases flowing from the genocide.111 The Rwandan 
judicial system, however, still is not capable of enforcing the Constitution and other 
laws, honouring the rights of the accused, or processing cases within a reasonable time 
frame.112
Although the status of the special chamber created to hear genocide cases and the 
judicial system as a whole has improved since 1994, the judiciary continues to suffer 
from inadequate resources, inefficiency, corruption, and executive influence.113 As few 
individuals with legal training were left in the country after the 1994 conflict, the 
111 M. A. Drumbl, ‘Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counselling the Accused in Rwanda’s Domestic 
Genocide Trials’, 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review (1998) pp. 593-94.
112
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country has struggled to find replacements for these key positions.114 Many of the 
judges are subject to threats of death or bodily injury and occasional influence by the 
government.115
The shortage of prosecutors and defence attorneys also has made it difficult to establish 
fair trials. Those individuals who do serve these functions are also susceptible to threats. 
Accusations have been made that prosecutors or defence counsels who readily support 
the rights of the accused will themselves become susceptible to charges of genocide.116
The accused are entitled to a defence attorney under the 1996 genocide law, but the state 
will not provide one if the accused is indigent. 
Many people who are incarcerated have not yet had charges brought against them. With 
the help of foreign assistance, case files were created for over fifty percent of the 
detainees in 1998.117 Periodically, the government releases thousands of suspects for 
which the prosecution has no case files. Though upwards of 15,000 prisoners have 
confessed, few of them have been processed because there are not enough officials to 
handle this volume of cases.118 The situation is even worse for those who are awaiting 
judgment by the Rwandan judicial system. As of February 2000, 130,000 individuals 
were awaiting trial on genocide charges. They were incarcerated in deplorable 
conditions: in prisons and military and communal detention centres that have an official 
114
 See Institute for Peace, Special Report, Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide (1994); 
Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: Unfair Trials: Justice Denied’, 8 April 1997, § 1, 
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1997/AFR/14700897.htm, visited 10 March 2000.
115
 See 1999 State Department Human Rights Report, supra note 112, Introduction.
116
 See Rwanda: Unfair Trials: Justice Denied, supra note 114, § 4(c).
117
 See 1999 State Department Human Rights Report, supra note 112, §1(d).
118 Ibid, § 1(e).
36
capacity of 30,000.119 A number of these individuals have been detained since 1994.120
Although Rwandan law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful detentions and 
arrests are common.121 Despite the fact that Rwandan law prohibits torture, NGOs 
report that the Rwandan authorities have tortured detainees.122 This only serves to 
reinforce the hard feelings between the two groups, as it appears to be some kind of 
victors justice, that may even turn the pacific sentiments held by moderate Hutus into 
bitterness. Specifically referring to the Rwandan proceedings, M. Minow concludes that 
“[r]ather than ending the cycles of revenge, the trials themselves were revenge”.123 No 
doubt the Hutu extremists will be itching for a chance to pay back the Tutsis in their 
own coin in the future.
In the past seven years since the passage of the domestic Genocide Law, over 5,000 
defendants have been processed by the specialized chambers124 however this though 
extremely impressive is inadequate. Senior judicial officials of the ICTR have noted that 
at the current processing speed it would likely take “400 years to try the 120,000 
people” in Rwandan prisons.125 In view of the slow pace of trials and the citizenry’s 
continued cries for justice, in July 1997, the government of Rwanda began 
contemplating alternatives to dealing with the huge numbers of detainees, the slow pace 
of trials and the lack of national reconciliation. It established a National Unity and 
119
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Reconciliation Commission in 1999 that initiated countrywide consultations on issues 
of co-existence between Hutus and Tutsis.126 The Commission ultimately recommended 
that Rwanda adopt the traditional Gacaca system, whereby respected community elders 
endeavour to bring disputants together in an effort to render communal justice.127 In 
turn, this led to the adoption of Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2001, setting 
up “Gacaca jurisdictions.”128 The Gacaca courts were inaugurated in 2002. Roughly 
260,000 men and women from every community were elected to preside over the 
courts, each of which has nineteen judges.129 Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, urged 
all Rwandans to participate in the Gacaca process, which began widespread 
implementation in June 2002.130 The participatory justice system of “gacaca,” a 
traditional mechanism for settling village quarrels, to deal with lower level offenders at 
a community level is an important move in the restorative justice paradigm. Kent 
Roach’s review of public inquiries131 reveals that their unique institutional features 
allow them to hold organisations and society accountable in ways that courts cannot.132
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The Gacaca Law preserves the basic structure of offences and the procedures for 
confessions and guilty pleas established by the Genocide Law, which formed the basis 
for domestic genocide trials.133 Specifically, it classifies detainees into one of four 
categories according to their alleged participation in particular crimes. “As in the 
Genocide Law, the Gacaca Law provides an incentive for defendants to confess and 
plead guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence. For both confession procedures, half of 
the defendant’s sentence will be served in custody while the rest is commuted into 
community service.”134
The gacaca system could have potentially positive or negative effects on achieving 
accountability and reconciliation in Rwanda. On the positive side, gacaca could ease the 
burden on the courts and prison system by helping to quickly process the innocent and 
guilty. The process also could have a cathartic effect by allowing many individuals in 
society to discuss the genocide, participate in the creation of justice and a standard of 
responsibility for criminal actions, and more swiftly deal with recent traumatic events. 
Gacaca advocates argue that gacaca is a more efficient solution for Rwanda because 
rehabilitative penalties can be quickly assigned if “the moral force of the village [is 
used] to shame perpetrators into admitting the truth.”135 Some Rwandans, who feel that 
Western- style justice is not working, believe this kind of group justice will serve as a 
tool for reconciliation.136 For example, Rwandan Justice Minister J. Mucyo, believes 
that the gacaca system will lead to truth for the whole society whereas western-style 
133 See Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of 
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since 1 October 1990, Law No. 8/96, Rwanda Official 
Gazette, 30 August 1996, art. 66.
134 See Ironside, supra note 124, pp. 44-45.
135 See E. Neuffer, ‘It Takes a Village’, The New Republic, 10 April 2000, p. 114.
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justice only leads to a small part of the truth for the accused, the judge, and the 
victims.137 This view is echoed by P. Ironside who observes:
“In the context of post-genocidal Rwanda, Gacaca may well be able to heal the deep 
wounds that continue to divide the country by ethnicity in a manner for which 
Western retributive systems are not designed. Indeed, it is unrealistic, impractical 
and short-sighted to rely solely on the ordinary criminal law model with all of its 
due process guarantees to address mass perpetration of crimes, particularly in a 
country whose judicial system has to be built ex nihilo and where ethnic tensions 
continue to run high.”138
Observers however have expressed a number of concerns with the gacaca system.139
Numerous concerns arise from the fact that the Gacaca system is structured as a speedy 
penal justice process but lacking the requisite due process safeguards. Although the 
African Commission on Human & People’s Rights stated in its Dakar Declaration of 11 
September 1999 that “traditional courts are not exempt from the provisions of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights relating to a fair trial,”140 the Gacaca 
process falls short of this and other internationally recognized standards. For instance, 
the Gacaca Law does not mention any entitlement of defendants to legal 
representation;141 the Gacaca Law does not allow defendants to present evidence during 
the process when the defendants are graded according to the severity of their crimes;142
and the practice of distributing cases for processing to Gacaca jurisdictions based on the 
136 See Report of the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Prepared by the Special Representative of the 
Commission on Human Rights Pursuant to Economic and Social Council Decision 1999/288, UN GAOR, 
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defendant’s residence before the genocide will inevitably result in unequal 
administration of justice.143
There are several other disadvantages to the gacaca system. As P. Ironside cautions “… 
many of its features resemble those of the criminal justice system but without all of the 
accompanying procedural safeguards, which raises concerns as to whether the new 
system will simply amount to criminal justice in the guise of popular justice.”144 In a 
further sobering reflection, Ironside observes that “Notwithstanding its capacity to yield 
beneficial, indeed essential, results, the Gacaca system also raises a number of valid 
concerns. For instance, while the process may heal some wounds, it could actually re-
open others and thereby exacerbate ethnic tensions. The potential also exists that the 
government’s motives are not altogether virtuous in instituting the Gacaca system, but 
rather stem from the increasing rate of acquittals by the specialized chambers, which the 
government may wish to curb by subjecting defendants to Gacaca’s community 
justice.”145  Overall then, the process could breed the spirit of vengeance and bitterness 
and help continue the culture of impunity instead of prevent it. Individuals participating 
in these processes might fabricate stories in order to seek revenge against certain 
individuals, feel reluctant to hold their families and neighbours accountable, or see this 
not as an opportunity to seek justice, but revenge.146 If these shortcomings could be 
dealt with, however, gacaca could have a significant impact by helping individuals 
realize on a personal level that they live in a society with accountability, law, and 
justice. In summary, although the Rwandan justice system still has a long way to go 
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144 See Ironside, supra note 124, p. 48.
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before becoming a model of impartiality and justice, international observers have 
reported that it has continued to make progress since the 1994 conflict.147
The Rwandan government has taken further steps outside the traditional adversarial 
legal system to deal with the genocide in the past and to prevent mass atrocities in the 
future. In 1999 the Rwandan government established a National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) and a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC).148
The role of the NHRC is to investigate human rights violations, especially by state 
actors, to train Rwandan citizens about human rights, and to assist in the initiation of 
judicial proceedings against persons suspected of committing human rights 
violations.149 These initiatives are important since much of the Tutsi minority, 
historically dominant, lives with the phobia of its physical elimination, while the Hutu 
majority demands proper political representation. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda 
heightened the fears of the minority, creating a volatile situation in which extremist 
elements in both communities may destroy the fragile peace in existence. In such an 
environment, dissemination of the wrongfulness of the ethno-centric hatred is important 
in avoiding the voices of moderation being drowned out, silenced or eliminated 
altogether. 150
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The UN and the international community were initially lulled into thinking that justice 
would come to Rwanda with an ‘effective’ ICTR, which was succeeding in securing 
custody of many of its indictees. A few years down the road, it was clear that the 
genocide in Rwanda was in fact the product of years of human rights violations151 and 
that an intense, creative, and sustained intervention involving the Rwandan government, 
civil society actors, UN entities, international financial institutions, and bilateral funding 
agencies was therefore needed to address the full spectrum of human rights.
If the ideal is to facilitate positive social change in Rwanda that brings about 
reconciliation and the respect for human rights, a system based on ill-thought-out 
symbolic justice or attainable mass retribution had to be re-oriented with a more 
thought-out and creative strategy regarding the structure and operation of the ICTR and 
a synergy with Rwandan domestic penal process. An actor-oriented perspective alone 
cannot prevent future human rights violations in Rwanda. It is unable to react 
adequately to social evils built into the social structure of the Rwandan society. The 
experience of the past nine years shows that the vicious cycle of violence, though 
somewhat muted, is very much alive.152 The Gacaca system provides an innovative and 
practical blend of retributive and restorative justice since it is within communities that 
most of the atrocities took place during the genocide yet victims were initially largely 
alienated from the international and domestic by distance, procedure and lack of 
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 For example, the lack of sufficient access to quality public education created some of the conditions 
whereby leaders could manipulate large portions of the population; these leaders promoted the lack of 
tolerance and institutionalised difference between societal groups.
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 A leader of one of the opposition groups composed mainly of Hutu extremists in an interview stated 
that the struggle will never end equating the laying down of arms before their demands are met which 
inter alia include the return to the 1992 Constitution as amounting to an acceptance of guilt to some 
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communication. “Because Gacaca is based on local culture, it is likely to create from the 
beginning a greater sense of familiarity, respect, trust and commitment to the process 
than the Western judicial system. As members of the community, Gacaca judges will 
have a sense of the full measure of injury that the community has suffered and can lead 
hearings to address those facts.”153 However there are valid grounds that despite its 
overall philosophy based on traditional dispute resolution, the system has significant 
penal characteristics albeit with few or no procedural safeguards against error or 
abuse.154 The Rwandan government must maintain active vigilance over the process lest 
it becomes a conduit for settling scores-real and imagined.
It is evident that the ugliness of the genocidal conflagration and the political reality of 
the ethnic hatred cannot be isolated into an international courtroom for resolution. The 
ICTR stands to make more sense if it was part of a comprehensive domestic and 
international process of punishment, reconstruction, and reconciliation. The Rwandan 
have a greater understanding of what is necessary to ensure that prosecutions meet the 
nation’s most important objectives. They are the people in struggle and cooperation, in 
association and disassociation. A complementary twin approach by the national and 
international penal process through a synchronic formula is likely to hit at the volatile 
polarised structure by challenging it through judicial activity. This will contribute to the 
Rwandan seeing their divided socio-political structure as one of the primary sources of 
their tragedy and try and withdraw or change it. The ICTR has had positive influences 
on the Rwandan national trials through allowing ‘raw’ Rwandan judges with little legal 
crime. See ‘Rebel Leader Says He Is Not In Arusha to Negotiate’, Internews, 24 July 2000, 
http://www.africanews.org/rwanda/ stories, visited 30 March 2001.
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 Ironside, supra note 124, p. 49.
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experience to attend ICTR trial sessions a move that is of enormous benefit to the newly 
trained jurists. In addition the ICTR has increasingly turned to a policy of generally 
enforcing its sentences in African prisons.155 The aim is not only to correct its image in 
Rwanda and Africa as a multi-million dollar Western conscience cleaning exercise but 
also to shed its image as a ritzy court that guarantees the guilty tickets to ‘luxurious’ 
European prisons. In addition it seeks to have a greater deterrent effect against impunity 
Africa, a continent that has largely come to be associated with despotic rulers, civil 
strife and sovereign excesses.
Even as the Rwandan government moves to try individuals handed over from the ICTR, 
it ought to bear in mind the need to both chastise the Hutus but also absolve the entire 
community indefinitely of guilt. As long as the individuals on the dock are seen in the 
wider context of the guilt of a community, the prosecutions can only lead to less 
chances of reconciliation and re-integration. More so as the individuals cut across 
various spectra of Rwandan society-military commanders and politicians, civilian 
administrators, the clergy and journalists thus seemingly representing a guilt that 
transcends all levels to cover each and every social rung of the Hutus. The Rwandan 
government, especially the judicial branch, should continue to take steps to ensure the 
legitimacy of its national genocide trials. The Rwandan society will benefit from fair 
and neutral judicial process than quick trials that seem to reflect political expedience as 
opposed to law. If the Rwandan justice system does not establish itself as a fair and just 
system, it could just as easily contribute to the cycle of vengeance as it could to ending 
it. On going conflict in the region and atrocities over which the ICTR has no jurisdiction 
154 See Carroll, supra note 102, p. 192; see E. Daly, ‘Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to 
Reconciliation’, 12 International Legal Perspectives (2001/02) p. 179.
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should fall within the purview of the domestic justice process which is not straitjacketed 
by a Security Council mandate as the ICTR is. Selective enforcement of the law against 
Hutu’s will not help dispel the ethnic venom of hatred which needs to be dispelled 
through both positive political goodwill as well as legal impartiality.156
The establishment of the ICTR and its singular focus on the prosecution of a miniscule 
fraction of the perpetrators of the genocide was initially a woefully inadequate way to 
redress the brutal murder of millions of Rwandans. However, the ICTR’s initially sterile 
approach has subsequently been supplemented by conflict management and resolution 
measures. These developments have been important in laying ground for a new 
paradigm combining the actor-oriented and structure-oriented perspectives, promoting 
an international law that truly permeates the human populace, not stopping at the gates 
of the State but bridging the gap between collective and individual actors better than it 
had done before. The key condition for such change is consciousness, and more 
sensitivity to the actor-structure relationship. Alongside trials, the outreach centre will 
facilitate dissemination of information that will help the two communities understand 
the weakness of the social structure and help ensure that the Rwanda situation is not 
simply a change of guard, one ethnic hegemony for another.
155 See generally, ICTR Statute, art. 23.
156 The Commission of Experts, established by the United Nations in 1994 to investigate crimes in 
Rwanda, concluded in their report that although they were unable to uncover any evidence that Tutsis had 
intended to destroy the Hutu ethnic group within the meaning of the Genocide Convention of 1948, there 
was overwhelming evidence to prove that Tutsis has committed crimes against humanity and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. See Report of the Commission of Experts on the Evidence of 
Grave Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Rwanda, Including Possible Acts of Genocide, 
S/1994/1125, 4 October 1994, paras. 93-100, 185-86.
